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CHAPTER 15 
Labor Relations Law 
ROBERT M. SEGAL and MICHAEL A. FEINBERG 
§15.I. Introduction. The 1969 SURVEY year in the field of labor 
law produced eight decisions by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, five decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, three decisions by the Federal District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, and one decision by the Supreme Judicial 
Court, along with a number of minor legislative charges in the labor 
laws of the Commonwealth. 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed four decisions of the 
National Labor Relations Board: the board's bargaining order based 
on union authorization cards;l the board's order that union disci-
pline for exceeding production rates established by the union did 
not violate the National Labor Relations Act;2 the board's order to 
an employer to pay fringe benefits as a remedy for a refusal to bar-
gain by the company;B the board's practice of requiring the employer 
to furnish a list of names and addresses of all its employees prior to 
elections.~ The other decisions include cases on the right of individ-
uals under the Railway Labor Act to maintain court action without 
exhausting contractual or administrative remedies where the latter 
appear to be futile;1I state courts' jurisdiction over peaceful secon-
dary picketing;1I the requirement of notice and a hearing before a 
worker's wages may be garnished;T and the application of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to labor relations com-
missions established to investigate and report the violation of crim-
inal statutes in the labor relations area.8 
In the lower federal courts, the First Circuit Court of Appeals' 
ROBl'.llT 1>1. SEGAL is a partner in the law firm of Segal &: Flamm in Boston. He is 
CX)·chairmin of the Labor Management Relations Committee of the Boston Bar 
Association, former chairman of the Labor Relations Law Section of the American 
Bar Association, and a lecturer on Labor Law at the Harvard Business School. 
MICHAEL A. FElNBEaG is a member of the firm of Segal &: Flamm. He is a former 
attorney with the National Labor Relation. Board. 
§15.1. 1 NUB v. Gisse1 Packing Co., 595 U.S. 575 (1969), petition for rehearing 
denied, - U.s. - (1969). 
2 Scofield v. NLRB, 594 u.s. 425 (1969). 
8 NLRB v. Strong, 595 u.s. 557 (1969). 
4. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 594 u.s. 759 (1969). 
II Glover v. St. Louit-San Francisco Ry., 595 U.S. 524 (1969). 
II Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 594 U.s. 569 (1969). 
'1 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 595 u.s. 537 (1969). 
8 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 595 u.s. 411 (1969). 
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decisions. all involved the National Labor Relations Board. Although 
three orders of the board were enforced,9 a fourth· was reversed,10 
and a fifth was partially reversed.11 In the Federal District Court for 
Massachusetts, the court dealt with a variety of issues: right of in-
dividuals to bring Section SOI(a) suits,12 validity of increases in union 
dues,18 and the arbitrability of disputes.H 
In the Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court considered 
only one labor matter (union elections).111 The General Court enacted 
labor measures ranging from increased benefits in unemployment16 
to a tightening of the regulation of professional strikebreakers17 and 
authorization of agency shops for the City of Boston employees.18 
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
§15.2. Bargaining order based on authorization cards. In NLRB 
v. Gissel Packing CO.,1 the United States Supreme Court, in a unan-
imous decision, affirmed the board's right to issue a bargaining order 
based on valid authorization cards obtained from a majority of the 
employees when the employer commits unfair labor practices that 
tend to undermine the union's majority status and make a fair elec-
tion an unlikely possibility. 
This decision actually encompassed four cases, three from the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and one from the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit cases contained the following 
common facts: The union waged an organizational campaign, ob-
taining authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the 
appropriate bargaining unit and then, based on these cards, demanded 
recognition. In each instance, the employer refused to bargain, ar-
guing that the authorization cards were inherently unreliable. In 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing CO.,2 an election was never held becaus~ 
the union had filed three unfair labor charges alleging refusal to 
bargain, coercion, and intimidation of employees and discharge of 
a union sympathizer. The activities on the part of the employer com· 
9 NLRB v. Consolidated Constructors and Builders, Inc., 406 F.2d 1081 (1st Cir. 
1969); 405 F.2d 1022 (1st Cir. 1969); 401 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1968). 
10 NLRB v. Gotham Industries, Inc., 406 F.2d IS06 (1st Cir. 1969). 
11 Corriveau v. Routhier Cement Block, Inc. v. NLRB, 410 F.2d !l47 (1st Cir. 1969). 
12 O'Sullivan v. Getty Oil Co., 296 F. Supp. 272 (D. Mass. 1969). 
18 Local 2, International Brotherhood of Telephone Workers v. International 
Brotherhood of Telephone Workers, 295 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Mass. 1969). 1. Republican Co. v. Springfield Newspaper Employees Assn., 294 F. Supp. lIOO 
(D. Mass. 1968). 
111 MacDonald v. Carr, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 17,24S N.E.2d 808. 
16 Acts of 1969, c. 614. 
11 Acts of 1969, c. 448, §l. 
18 Acts of 1969, c. lIS5, §§1 and 2. 
§15.2. 1 S95 U.s. 575 (1969), petition for rehearing denied, - U.S. - (1969). 
2 S98 F.2d SS6 (4th Cir. 1968). 
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menced early in the organizational campaign.s In NLRB v. Heck's 
Inc.,' similar activities by the employer following the demand for 
recognition led to unfair labor practice charges which precluded 
the holding of an election.G In General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB,6 
an election was held and won by the employer. However, this elec-
tion was later set aside because of unfair labor practices committed 
by the employer throughout the union's campaign.7 
The board, in each case, found that the unions had obtained valid 
authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the appro-
priate bargaining units and that the employers' refusals to bargain 
were based not on a "good faith" doubt but on a desire to gain time 
in an attempt to dissipate the majority status of each union.s 
The Fourth Circuit, althoqgh finding Section 8(a)(I) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act violations present in all three cases and 
a Section 8(a)(5) violation of the act in Gissel, refused to enforce the 
board's bargaining order in each case. The court concluded that 
because of the inherent unreliability of authorization cards, the em· 
ployers had good faith doubts as to the majority status of the unions. 
In addition, the court noted that the Taft-Hartley amendments to 
the National Labor Relations Act provided that elections be the 
sole basis for certification.9 
In NLRB v. Sinclair CO.,10 the general fact pattern of the other 
three cases was also present. At the onset of the union's organizational 
efforts, the employer committed unfair labor practices which intim-
idated and coerced the employees. These activities continued up to 
the election. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order 
of the board requiring the company to bargain upon request. Since 
the First Circuit rejected the company's position concerning the in-
herent unreliability of authorization cards, this raised a conflict with 
the Fourth Circuit. In addition, in Sinclair, the employer claimed 
that statements regarding the future financial posture of the com-
pany, if the union won, were not violative of Section 8(a)(I) of the 
act but, rather, were protected by Section 8(c) of the act and the First 
Amendment. 
8 S95 U.S. at 580. 
4 S98 F.2d SS7 (4th Cir. 1968). 
G S95 U.s. at 580-581. 
6 S98 F.2d SS9 (4th Cir. 1968). 
7 S95 U.s. at 582. The employer in this case also raised the question of the 
validity of the cards. The Court found that the card. on its face. was ambiguous 
(authorizing the union to represent the employee and not to seek an election) and 
the employees were not told that the cards would be used ~lely to seek an election. 
Based on this. the Court approvingly applied the board's rule in Cumberland Shoe 
Corp .• 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (I96S). which was reaffirmed in Levi Strauss Be Co .• 172 
N.L.R.B. No. 57. 68 L.R.R.M. ISS8 (1968). and concluded the cards were valid. Id. 
at 584. 
8 Id. at 582-58S. The lack of good faith was based upon the substantial unfair 
labor practices committed by each employer. 
9 S98 F.2d SS6 at SS7; S98 F.2d at SS8-SS9; S98 F.2d at S40. 
10 S97 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). 
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In determining whether authorization cards could in fact be the 
basis for a bargaining order, the Supreme Court found it necessary 
to analyze the board's approach to cards. Stemming from the rule 
enunciated by the board in Joy Silk v. NLRB,l1 which held that an 
employer could refuse to bargain with a union claiming majority 
status solely through authorization cards, if it had a "good faith" 
doubt as to the union's majority status, the board issued bargaining 
orders based on two premises. First, the employer had the burden 
of coming forward with its reasons for refusing to bargain; and second, 
the unfair labor practices committed by the employer belied its "good 
faith" reasons and evidenced an intent to dissipate the union's ma-
jority status. 
The burden of proving lack of good faith was shifted to the gen-
eral counsel in Aaron Brothers.12 More significantly, Aaron Brothers 
also allowed the employer to refuse to recognize the union based 
solely on cards and to insist on an election. In addition, the board 
required that the unfair labor practices of the employer must have 
a tendency to dissipate the union's majority. 
Thus, it was not surprising when the board at oral argument ad-
mitted that it had abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine and particularly 
its reliance on a "good faith" test of employers' motives in not rec-
ognizing unions whose right to recognition was based solely on cards. 
Following the decision in Aaron Brothers, the general counsel stated 
that the present practice of issuing a complaint does not depend 
significantly upon the employer's good faith doubt; of considerably 
more importance is the effect of any unfair labor practice committed 
by this employer. If the effect of the unfair labor practice is that 
the holding of a fair election is precluded, and if the union obtained 
valid authorization cards from a majority of the appropriate bar-
gaining unit, a complaint will issue seeking a bargaining order as 
the appropriate remedy. IS "Thus, an employer can insist that a union 
go to an election, regardless of his subjective motivation, so long as 
he is not guilty of misconduct .... "14 
It was within this framework that the Court faced the question 
as to whether a bargaining obligation can arise outside of the con-
text of an election. The Court concluded that since Section 8(a)(5) 
makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain subject to Sec-
tion 9(a), then an election need not be the only means of selection 
of authorized union representation.111 Concluding that the bargaining 
1185 N.L.R.B. 1265 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 
541 U.S. 914 (1951). 
12 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966). 
13895 U.S. at 594. The rejection of the cards by the employer is not insignificant 
when the employer has independent knowledge of the union's majority status. For 
instance, where the employer is faced with a strike or picket line supported by a 
majority of his employees, it may not insist on an election. Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
111 Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an Election, 65 Mich. L 
Rev. 857 (1967). 
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obligation can be created by other than an election, the Court then 
decided that authorization cards are not such an inherently unre-
liable indicator as to prevent their use in this regard. 
In addition to the power to recognize authorization cards, the 
board has long held the power to issue a bargaining order, after the em-
ployer has committed substantial unfair labor practices, without 
requiring the union to evidence that it would have been able to 
maintain its majority status.16 In fact, the board's authority to issue 
a bargaining order is no less even when the union, once having rep-
resented a majority, represents only a mInority after the employer 
has engaged in unfair labor practices.17 It is interesting to note that 
the Court answers the employers' complaint that bargaining order 
is "an unne<:essary harsh remedy" by belittling the e~ect of a bar-
gaining order. As the Court stated, "There is, after all, nothing per-
manent in a bargaining order, and if, after the effects of the employer's 
acts have worn off, the employees clearly desire to disavow the union, 
they can do so by filing a decertification petition."lS 
Having concluded that the bargaining order may be an appro-
priate remedy, the Court emphasized that the board's present prac-
tice calls for its use only after the union has attained a majority 
status and after a refusal by the employer to recognize the union, 
accompanied by unfair labor practices which either made unfair 
an election that was held19 or precluded the holding of a fair elec-
tion. Since the three Fourth Circuit cases were decided by the board 
in reliance on the Joy Silk good faith test and not under its current 
practice of determining the unfair labor practices' effects on the 
election process, they were remanded to the board for proper find-
ings. In the First Circuit case, however, the board had decided that 
the unfair labor practices were so grievous and substantial that a 
bargaining order was the only proper remedy. Thus, since the board 
did not utilize the good faith test, the Court concluded there was 
no need to remand. 
As mentioned above, an additional issue was present in Sinclair, 
where the employer sought protection for his statements in the First 
Amendment. The First Circuit had agreed with the board that cer-
tain statements of the employer which, in part, predicted the eco-
nomic ruin of the company if the employees voted for the union, 
were violative of the act. In deciding whether this. was constitution-
ally protected speech, the Court considered the labor relations setting 
to be paramount, characterizing .it as a "non-permanent, limited 
relationship between the employer, his economically dependent em-
ployee and his union agent. . . ."20 In this context, the employer 
18 NLRB v. Katz, 569 U.s. 756 (1962). 
11 Franks Broa. Co. v. NLRB, 521 U.s. 702 (1944). 
IS 595 u.s. at 6IS. 
19 Bemel Foam Products Co., 146 N.L.R..B. 1277 (19M). 
20595 U.s. at 617. 
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is not free to say whatever he chooses. Because of the intrinsic de-
pendence of employees upon the employer, the Court concluded 
that it is not unreasonable to expect and demand objective facts to 
be the basis of any employer-volunteered predictions of the effects 
of unionization. Failing to satisfy this test of objectivity, Sinclair 
was rightfully found to have violated Section 8(a)(I).21 
Unquestionably, the decision in Gissel affords firm judicial pro-
tection to the organizing efforts of unions. Although it allows an 
employer to demand an election without inquiry as to motive, it has 
validated the general use of a bargaining order in reliance on cards 
after virtually any serious employer misconduct has been shown, 
thus establishing a bargaining obligation by means other than a board 
election. It is submitted that the present practice of the board, re-
quiring that the union show the employer's "independent and sub-
stantial unfair practices disruptive of election conditions"22 before 
a bargaining order may be validly entered, represents a more equi-
table and workable standard than the former practice of requiring 
a showing that the employer had no "good faith doubt" as to the 
union's majority status before entering the order. 
§15.3. Union discipline for exceeding production rates estab-
lished by the union. In Scofield v. NLRB,l the Court reaffirmed 
its reasoning in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. CO.,2 which had held 
that when employees violate a union rule establishing a ceiling on 
the production for which union members may accept immediate 
piecework pay, the union may levy reasonable fines, and that failure 
to pay these fines may lead to expulsion. In Scofield, such a rule had 
been established. 1£ the employee exceeded the production ceiling, 
the employer retained the money due the employee and disbursed 
it when the production ceiling was not reached. Plaintiffs worked 
during bargained-for rest periods, and thereby exceeded the produc-
tion ceiling set by the union. The union, having discovered that they 
exceeded the ceiling, fined them $50 to $100 and suspended them 
from the union for a year. After the union sought to collect these 
fines in state court, the plaintiffs filed unfair labor practice charges 
with the National Labor Relations Board. The board found that 
there was no violation of the National Labor Relations Act.8 Its 
decision was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals." 
Aside from a question of the timeliness of petition for certiorari,1S 
21 Id. at 618. 
22 Id. at 591. 
§15.3. 1394 U.s. 423 (1969). 
2388 U.S. 175 (1967). 
8145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964). 
"393 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1968). 
IS The board argued that the petition must be filed within 90 days after the 
entry of the judgment or decree of the circuit court. Although an opinion of the 
circuit court was delivered on March 5, 1968, the charge was not entered until 
6
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the Court was faced with the question of whether the union rule 
was valid as falling within the provisions of Section 8(b)(1) of the 
National Labor Relations Act. Relying on its interpretation of Sec-
tion 8(b)(I) as expressed in Allis-Chalmers, the Court distinguished 
between internal and external enforcement of union rules. The Court 
concluded that as long as the rule is duly adopted and not "the ar-
bitrary fiat"6 of a union official, and as long as it does not affect a 
member's employment status, it does not conflict with 8(b)(1).'I' Ap-
plying Section 8(b)(I) to the instant situation, the Court found that 
the Section 
. . . leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule 
which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Con-
gress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced 
against union members who are free to leave the union and 
escape the rule.s 
Finding that the fines were reasonable, that they were not imposed 
at the whim of a union official, that membership in the union was vol-
untary and that enforcement of the rule was through acceptable means, 
the question then faced by the Court was the "legitimacy of the union 
interest vindicated by the rule and the extent to which any policy of 
the Act may be violated by the union-imposed production ceiling."9 
After acknowledging that unions have historically opposed unlimited 
piecework pay systems because of fears that "such systems will drive up 
employee productivity and in turn create pressures to lower the piece-
work rate so that ... employees are earning little more than they did 
before .•. ,"10 the Court concluded that unions therefore have a legit-
imate interest in establishing production. ceilings. for piecework-pay 
workers. Having established a union's right to maintain such a rule 
in general, the Court examined the particular rule before it to deter-
mine if it contravened the labor policy of the act. The fact that the 
union had never refused to bargain over this rule, combined with the 
fact that the company cooperated in banking the employees' money, 
was ample evidence that the rule did not adversely affect the collective 
bargaining relationship. The Court further found that the rule did 
not violate the collective-bargaining agreement, since the contract 
allowed each employee to produce as much as he wished, and it found 
April 16, 1968. Thus, when plaintiffs' petition was docketed on July 6, 1968, it was 
found to be timely. 
6394 U.S. at 428. 
'I' Of course, the Court stressed that even if the rule fulfills these requirements, it 
will still violate Section 8(b)(1) if it does not effectuate the polley of the act. See, 
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, 159 N.L.R.B. 
1065 (1968); Local 138, International Union of Operating Engineers, 148 N.L.R.B. 
679 (1964). 
S 394 u.s. at 450. 
9Id. at 431. 
10 Ibid. 
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no evidence that the rule distinguished between members and non-
members of the union. As Allis-Chalmers had pointed out, it is not per 
se violative of the act if the union rule prevents members from accept-
ing work from his employer. 
In concluding its opinion, the Court stated that because "[T]he 
union rule . . . left the collective bargaining process unimpaired, 
breached no collective contract, required no pay for unperformed 
service, induced no discrimination by the employer against any class 
of employees ... ,"11 it would hold the rule to be valid and therefore 
not proscribed by Section 8(b)(I)(A). Thus, the Court once more reaf-
firmed the essential right of a union to promulgate a rule under the 
act concerning a matter over which it has a legitimate interest, and to 
enforce the rule in a reasonable manner against noncomplying mem-
bers. 
§15.4. Remedial power of the National Labor Relations Board: 
Award of fringe benefits. In NLRB v. Strong,! the respondent with-
drew from a multiple employer bargaining association following the 
negotiation of a contract between the association and the union. After 
repeated efforts on the part of the union to secure the signature of 
respondent on the contract, the union filed charges under Section 
8(a)(I) and 8(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. The board found 
that the respondent had violated the act and ordered it to sign the con-
tract and "[p]ay ... any fringe benefits provided for in the ... con-
tract.":! The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce that 
part of the order requiring th~ paying of fringe benefits that were due 
and owing had the contract been signed.8 
The Court found that the broad remedial powers granted to the 
board in Section IO(c) of the act, including the power to award back 
pay, authorized the ordering of payments of fringe benefits retroactive 
to the effective date of the contract. 1£ further found that the board, 
having established that the respondent'S refusal to sign a contract 
negotiated by the employer's association was an unfair labor practice,4 
was not administering or enforcing the collective bargaining contract 
between the parties when it required the employer to abide by its 
fringe benefit provisions from its effective date. 
Thus, the Court, by enforcing the retroactive payment of these 
contract benefits, seems to have underscored the latitude afforded the 
board in its remedial powers incident to its adjudication of an unfair 
labor practice. 
§15.5. Validity of the Excelsior rule. In one of the more complex 
and curious decisions of the 1969 SURVEY year, the Supreme Court, in 
11 Id. at 486. 
§15.4. 1898 U.S. 857 (1969), noted in 10 B.C. Ind. Be Com. L. Rev. 1015 (1969). 
:! 152 N.L.R.B. 9, 14 (1965). 
8886 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1968). 
4 H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB. lIll U.S. 514 (1941). 
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NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon CO.,l upheld the practice by the board of 
requiring employers to furnish the names and addresses of its employees 
to unions prior to elections. This type of practice, commonly known 
as the Excelsior rule, stems from the board's decision in Excelsior 
Underwear Inc.2 
Faced with a refusal by Excelsior to furnish the requested list of 
names and addresses, the board, prior to its hearing of the case, invited 
"certain interested parties" to file briefs and present oral argument on 
the issue of whether such a list should be provided to the opposing 
union.8 Following the hearing, the board found that such a procedure 
was desirable but could not be equitably imposed on Excelsior. It 
therefore announced that the rule would take effect only with respect 
to those elections directed, or consented to, 30 days from the date of its 
decision." 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce a subpoena 
requiring the Wyman-Gordon Co., pursuant to the Excelsior rule, to 
furnish such a list.1i The First Circuit felt that the Excelsior rule had 
not been promulgated pursuant to the dictates for rule-making pre-
scribed by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).o 
The Supreme Court could not reach a majority opinion on the issues 
in the case. Rather, four Justices joined in the judgment of the Court. 
In the main, this segment of the plurality opinion agreed with the First 
Circuit that the Excelsior rule did not comply with- the requirements 
of the AP A, particularly since it was not published in the Federal 
Register and only selected parties were given notice of the hearing.T 
The judgment of the Court stressed to a large degree that the rule had 
been applied prospectively and therefore did not fall within the 
"adjudication" authority granted by the National Labor Relations 
Act.s However, notwithstanding the fact that the rule, when promul-
gated, had not complied with the AP A and was not a strict adjudication 
since applied only prospectively, the Court reversed the First Circuit. 
It reasoned that, because the respondent had been directed to submit 
the list, and that this order was part of a larger order of the board 
directing an election, it was valid and should have been enforced. 
The concurring opinion, in which three Justices joined, reversed the 
First Circuit for far different reasons. They felt that administrative 
agencies, including the board, have the power both to make rules 
and adjudicate controversies. In the instant case, they found that the 
adjudication in the board decision in Excelsior Underwear set a prece-
§15.5. 1 394 U.s. 759 (1969). 
2156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
8 Id. at 1238. 
"Id. at 1240 n.5. 
Ii Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d S94 (1st Cir. 1968), noted in 1968 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §IS.3. 
05 U.s.C. §55S (1964). 
T S94 U.s. at 764. 
829 U.s.C. §§159(c)(I), 160 (1964). 
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dent to guide future conduct and had the same power and effect - and 
should have been accorded such - as if it had been a rule which fol-
lowed the APA requirements.1I This portion of the plurality opinion 
found no dispute as to the propriety of the procedural safeguards 
utilized by the board in its Excelsior decision. The fact that Excelsior 
was applied prospectively, relied upon so heavily by the judgment of 
the Court, is not critical to the concurring opinion. The key factor 
influencing the concurring Justices was that the decision in Excelsior 
had been reached only after a proper hearing. The "Excelsior rule" 
then evolved out of a valid order following this decision. The con-
curring opinion concluded that to invalidate any rule applied pros-
pectively would require the board to predict in which cases prospective 
application would be equitable, and then 
... be faced with the unpleasant choice of either starting all 
over again to evaluate the merits of the question, this time in a 
"rule-making" proceeding, or overriding the considerations of 
fairness and applying its order retroactively anyway, in order to 
preserve the validity of the new practice and avoid duplication 
of effort.10 
Such a procedure, the concurring opinion found, would be impractical, 
inflexible and undesirable. 
The two dissenting opinions, written separately by Justices Douglas 
and Harlan, culled various arguments from both the judgment of the 
Court and the concurring opinion to reach their opposite results. They 
agreed with the judgment of the Court that, in applying the rule 
prospectively, the board had promulgated. a rule and therefore erred 
in not complying with the APA. The dissenting opinions also agreed 
with the concurring opinion that if the board did indeed err it could 
not transpose this incorrectly promulgated rule into a valid order by 
incorporating the language of the Excelsior decision into each sub-
sequent decision it made concerning the same issue. In sum, the dis-
senting opinions found the Excelsior rule to be improperly promul-
gated, and thus invalid. For this reason they found that the First Circuit 
was correct in refusing to enforce the board's order requiring Wyman-
Gordon to furnish the list. 
§15.6. Railway Labor Act: Right to maintain court action without 
exhausting contractual or administrative remedies. In Glover v. St. 
Louis-San Francisco Ry.,l the 18 petitioners, eight Negroes and five 
white men, all repair and maintenance employees of the defendant 
railroad, had brought an action in United States District Court against 
the railroad and the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America, 
their duly selected bargaining agent. The complaint alleged that the 
plaintiffs were not promoted to positions for which they were experi-
"594 u.s. at 770-771. 
10Id. at 774-775. 
§15.6. 159!1 U.s. 524 (1969). 
10
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enced. This was alleged to be due to "a tacit understanding between 
defendants and a subrosa agreement .. :'2 entered into to avoid pro-
moting Negro applicants. 
The defendants sought to dismiss the complaints because, in part, 
the petitioners had not exhausted the administrative remedies provided 
for them in the collective bargaining agreement, in the constitution 
of the union, and before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. 
The motion to dismiss was sustained by the district court in an unre-
ported decision. In an attempt to avoid the dismissal, the plaintiffs 
amended their complaint and detailed the instances wherein both the 
company and the brotherhood allegedly had rebuffed, ridiculed and 
denied every attempt of the plaintiffs to file grievances. In addition, 
the amended complaint explained that any action before the National 
Railroad Adjustment Board, composed of representatives from union 
and management, would take five years. The district court again dis-
missed the complaint and its decision was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.s The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the 
case for trial. 
The CoUrt reasoned that although Section 8 of the Railway Labor 
Act· confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Railroad Adjustment Board 
to interpret the meaning of collective bargaining agreements, the act 
was meant to apply only to "disputes between an employee ... and 
a carrier .... "11 In any event, the Court, in refusing to draw 'a distinc-
tion between "discriminatory action in negotiating the. terms of an 
agreement and discriminatory enforcement of terms that are fair on 
their face,"8 found that the dispute was essentially between employees 
on the one hand and management and the union on the other. Collat-
erally, the Court concluded that the Railroad Adjustment Board did 
not possess the type of power necessary to remedy the abuses alleged 
in the complaint. 
The Court could not accept an argument that the plaintiffs had 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Where, as here, the 
remedies are controlled to a major extent by both the company and 
union, the Court held that it would be "absolutely futile" for plaintiffs 
to pursue the possibility of administrative relief.7 Based on the allega-
tions of the complaint in Glover, the Court concluded that any efforts 
by the plaintiffs to pursue contractual or administrative remedies 
would be wasted; and consequently the district court should have 
exerted jurisdiction over the matter. 
§15.7. Railway Labor Act: Peaceful secondary picketing protected 
against state proscription. The Court placed stringent restrictions on 
2Id. at 1125. 
8 llS6 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1967) • 
• 45 U.S.C. §15!1(1). 
II !l9!1 U.S. at 1129. 
8 Ibid. 
'1Id. at !llli. 
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state courts' jurisdiction over peaceful secondary picketing in Railroad 
Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal CO.1 This case appears to represent 
the culmination of litigation in the longest railroad labor dispute in 
the history of this country.2 
Briefly stated, the facts involved petitioners who, after exhausting 
all procedures under the Railway Labor ActS to settle a dispute as to a 
change in working conditions, struck and picketed various locations 
of the Florida East Coast Railway Conipany (FEC), including the 
respondent Terminal Company. A United States District Court issued a 
temporary restraining order enjoining petitioners from picketing any 
place other than the "reserved gate" set up for FEC employees. The 
order was discharged by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding 
that the district court was precluded by the Norris-LaGuardia Act4 
from issuing an injunction.!' The Supreme Court by an equally divided 
Court, aHirmed.6 While that litigation 'was pending in the federal 
courts, respondents sought a similar remedy in the state courts. The 
state court issued the temporary injunction; and after failing on appeals 
within the state courts, the petitioners sought, and were granted, 
certiorari by the Supreme Court.T 
The Court found that the respondent's activities were, in fact, an 
integral part of FEC's normal operation.s The Court, however, avoided 
the question of whether petitioner's activity constituted a secondary 
activity as defined by the Labor Management Relations Act.9 The 
Court reasoned that the Railway Labor Act permitted employees to 
engage in some forms of self-help, inclusive in which would be primary 
strikes and picketing in support of such strikes; that not all picketing 
carrying secondary implications is prohibited; that the picketing in-
volved in the instant case is not necessarily secondary in nature; and, 
finally, that the Labor-Management R~lations Act, and the body of 
law concerning secondary picketing which has evolved from it, should 
not be applied to parties subject to the Railway Labor Act without a 
clear mandate from Congress. 
Based upon these conclusions, the Court reversed the state court 
judgments holding that it should not undertake, under the present 
legislative design, to delineate which picketing is federally protected 
and which is subject to state courts. Further, the Court stated that 
§15.7. 1394 u.s. 369 (1969). 
2Id. at 371. 
845 U.s.C. §§151·188, as amended, 45 U.s.C. §§153, 154 (Supp. III, 1965·1967). 
429 U.S.C. §101·1l5 (1964). 
Ii Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649 
(5th Cir. 1966). 
6 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R:.R., 385 U.S. 20 
(1966). 
1 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 392 U.s. 904 
(1968). 
8394 U.S. at 3711. 
929 U.s.C. §§141·187 (1964). 
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parties, after exhausting .all Railway Labor Act procedures, are allowed 
to employ peaceful economic pressures so long as they do not conflict 
with other aspects of federal1aw. 
§15.8. Garnishment of wages: Requirement of notice and a hear-
ing. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,! the respondent attached 
$31.59 of the petitioner's $65 per week salary. This Wisconsin statute 
on garnishments provided no right to notice or hearing to con~est the 
legality of the garnishment. In a 7 to I opinion, the Court held that 
due process of law required a hearing before the wages might be 
garnished. 
Although this opinion concerned 18 states, Massachusetts was not 
directly affected, for the Massachusetts statute on trustee process now 
requires notice and hearing.2 Given the general tone of the decjsion, 
however, and the fact that the Court had few kind words for garnish-
ments since they impose great difficulties on the average wage earner 
who has a family to support, MassachUsetts soon may be forced to 
review its garnishment law, which presently insulates only $80 of the 
weekly salary and $40 from pension payments from garnishment.8 
§15.9. Legislative investigations. In Jenkins v. McKeithen1 the 
Court considered the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute which 
established a Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry.2 The only 
purpose of this commission is to investigate violations, or possible viola-
tions, of state or federal criminal laws "arising out ot or in connection 
with matters in the field of}abor-management relations ..•. "8 In order 
to perform its. mission, the commission has the power to employ in-
vestigators, compel testimony, and to require production of books, 
records and other evidence.' Its findings are a matter of public record. 
If it finds probable cause t() believe a crime has been committed, it is 
required to report it to the proper authority.s· However, although 
under the statute any witness required to attend is given notice and 
allowed counsel, no .witness had the right to call individuals to testify, 
and his counsel did not have an absolute right to cross-examine any 
other witness.4I Petitioners sought both declaratory Bl;ld injunctive relief 
before a three-judge court, alleging the unconstitutionality of the 
act and of certain actions taken by state oflicials in the administration 
of the act. The court granted the motion to dismiss.' 
The Supreme Court found that the due process clause of the Four-
§15.8. 1595 u.s. 557 (1969). 
2 G.L., c. 246. 
8 Acts of 1969, c. 276, §1, amending GoL, c. 276, §28. 
§15.9. 1595 u.s. 411 (1969). . 
2 La. Rev. Stat. AnD:. §§2lI:880.1-2lI:880.18 (Supp. 1969). 
8 Preamble, La. R.ev. Stat. Ann. P:880.1-2lI:880.18 (Supp. 1969). 
'La. ~. Stat. Ann. 28:880.8 (Sopp. 1969). 
G Id. §2lI.880.7 (B). 
41 Id. §2lI:880.10(B). 
'Jenkins v. McKeIthen, 288 r. Supp. 557 (B.D. La. 1988). 
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teenth Amendment requires that the Commission of Inquiry allow 
witnesses the right of confrontation and cross-examination, and the 
right to call witnesses in their own behalf. The Court reasoned that, 
since the commission exercised a function similar to that of adjudicat-
ing criminal culpability and was limited to exploring only criminal 
matters, witnesses called before it should be accorded the full protec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
B. FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS DECISIONS 
§15.10. Employee misconduct while engaged in protected activity. 
In Corriveau v. Routhier Cement Block, Inc. v. NLRB,1 the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a portion of the bOlud's order, which 
found that a statement of an employer to one of his employees ("You 
must know who went union")2 constituted, under the circumstances in 
which it was uttered, an implied interrogation of a coercive nature 
concerning union organizational activities, which was in violation of 
Section 8(a)(I) of the National Labor Relations Act. The court, how-
ever, refused to enforce another part of the board's order which would 
have required the employer to reinstate with back pay two discharged 
employees who were stipulated to have stated, at a union meeting off 
company premises and two days before the election, that they would 
discover any employee who did not vote for the union and "see him 
down the road:'& In spite of the fact that this pronouncement was not 
heard by all of the employees4 and that the president of the company 
learned of it only from his yard manager, who had heard it from two 
other employees, the company president fired the two employees the day 
before the election because of these alleged threats of violence against 
fellow employees. 
The court rejected the board's argument that misconduct during a 
union meeting is analogous to misconduct on a picket line.1I Instead, 
the court stressed the violent nature of the threat "to see the person 
down the road" and concluded that no violation existed in the dis-
charge of these employees since "[t]hreats of violence ... are the very 
antithesis of protected activity."s 
In support of its argument the court relied upon NLRB v. Ogle 
Protection Service, Inc.;r wherein the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that, where it did not appear that the primary motivation for 
discharge of an employee was related to the employee's participation 
in union activity, the employer's right to discharge is not restricted by 
the National Labor Relations Act. However, the Ogle court concluded 
§15.10. 1410 F.2d 547 {1st Cir. 1969}. 
2 Id. at 549. 
& Ibid. 
4Id. at 350. 
IS Corriveau &: Routhier Cement Block, Inc., 68 LA.R.M. 1184, 1185 (1968). 
6410 F.2d at 1151. 
T 575 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 589 u.s. 845 (1967). 
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that, in fact, there was no union activity involved on the part of the 
dischargees, and therefore the board could not judge the criteria used 
by the employer in deciding to discharge its employees. This, of course, 
is not the case in Corriveau; there is no dispute as to the fact that the 
statements made by the dischargees were made in the course of a union 
organizational meeting. The right to organize is the very touchstone 
of the act and is deserving of the utmost protection the act can pro-
vide.s 
In support of its argument that being engaged in protected activity 
is not a shield against employer retaliation for misconduct by em-
ployees, the court cited Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB.9 There are, 
however, critical differences between the facts of Montgomery Ward 
and those of Corriveau. In Montgomery Ward, the misconduct involved 
w:as an employee's use of invective against a customer who had crossed 
the picket line. This particular customer then complained to the 
employer: In Corriveau, however, the misconduct consisted of state-
ments made to fellow employees at a union meeting off company prop-
erty, thus pointing u,p the crucial distinction between the two cases. 
Furthermore, in Moritgomery Ward, a stranger to both the protected 
activity and the employer relayed certain information to the employer 
based upon which it took certain action. In Corriveau, the employer 
discharged two employees based upon information that could only have 
come from other employees at the union meeting. Thus, whether in-
advertently or purposefully, the employer in Corriveau created, at the 
very least, the impression of surveillance of union meetings, which, as 
the board stated,10 is well settled as being a violation of Section 8(a)(I) 
of the act. 
The concept of protected activity is of such importance under the 
act that a balancing test must be utilized to determine if misconduct on 
the part of employees engaged in such activity justifies· retaliatory 
measures on the part of the employer.ll As the board stated, "employees 
who participate in union meetings would be unduly jeopardized if 
any and all 'misconduct' were automatically to constitute grounds for 
employee discharge .... "12 The critical question is the gravity of the 
misconduct of the employees. It should be pointed out that in Corriveau 
this very same misconduCt was reported to the yard manager approx-
imately two weeks before. the election. Although not reported to the 
company president, no evidence was presented of the incident's having 
any disruptive effect 011 the company's working force; nor did there 
appear evidence· of any other misconduct other than that for which 
the employees were discharged. It iii also significant that the statement 
s NLRB v. Burnup and Sims, Inc., 579 u.s. 21 (1964). 
9574 F.2d 606 (lOth Cir. 1967). 
10 68 L.R.R.~. at 1185. 
11 See Stewart Hog Ring Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 510 (1961): Schott Metal Products Co., 
128 N.L.R.B. 415 (1960). 
12 68 L.R.R.M. at 1185. 
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was made in general terms and addressed to all the employees collec-
tively.18 
It is submitted that the statement "to see someone down the road" 
is vague, and, when addressed to a group, need not necessarily mean 
that bodily harm would be the inevitable consequence of voting against 
the union in a secret ballot. The court states that the threat is clear 
because with only nine men voting "in such a small group ... many 
people make their views commonly known. . .. "14 There is, however, 
no evidence that any of the employees expressed sentiments against 
the union. Further, it does not seem likely that if the discharged em-
ployees knew who was planning to vote against the union, they would 
have addressed their statement to the whole group. 
If such "misconduct" is put in balance with the action taken by 
the employer one day before the election, in firing these two men (out 
of a total of nine employees), both of whom were obvious union 
sympathizers, the board's order of reinstatement with back pay does 
not seem improper. As the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated in approving a "balancing test" promulgated by the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals: 
[T]o hold that employee "misconduct" automatically precludes 
compulsory reinstatement ignores two considerations which we 
think important. First the employer's antecedent unfair labor 
practices may have been so blatant that they provoked employees 
to resort to unprotected action. Second, reinstatement is the only 
sanction which prevents an employer from benefiting from his 
unfair labor practices through discharges which may weaken or 
destroy a union.11i 
It appears, therefore, that the "misconduct" of the discharged em-
ployees occurring, as it did, while they were engaged in protected 
activity, was not of sufficient gravity to warrant disciplinary discharge. 
As a consequence, these discharges were violative of Section 8(a)(I) and 
(3) of the act and the decision of the board to reinstate the employees 
with back pay was not without strong evidentiary support and should 
not have been disturbed. 
§15.1I. Wage increase prior to a representation election. In NLRB 
v. Gotham Industries, Inc.,l the court refused to enforce an order of 
the board which would have required the employer to cease and desist 
from implementing and/or promising certain wage increases while, 
at the same time, accusing the union of trying to prevent these wage 
increases by filing complaints of unfair labor practices.2 On November 
18410 F.2d at 350. 
14 Id. at 350 n.4. 
111 Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
§15.11. 1406 F.2d 1306 (1st Cir. 1969). 
2 Gotham Industries, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 66 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1967). 
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21. 1965, the union lost a board-conducted election which, after objec-
tions were filed, was put aside to be rerun at a later-determined date. 
In January, 1964, the union filed unfair labor practice charges based 
upon activities on the part of the employer unrelated to the instant 
case.3 After both the trial examiner and the board had found these 
activities to be violative of the act, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
enforced the board's order in May 1966.4 
Sometime during the posting period, which was to terminate on or 
about August SO, 1966, the plant superintendent met with some of the 
employees, at their request, to discuss the possibility of wage increases. II 
The demands of the employees were relayed to the general manager, 
who, after investigation, told certain employees that a wage increase 
would be given in December. On September 14, 1966, at a meeting, 
and on September 22, 1966, through a notice, the rest of the employees 
were notified of this wage increase. On September 23, 1966, the regional 
director informed the employer that the rerun election would take 
place shortly. Based upon the promised wage increase, the union filed 
unfair labor practice charges which ultimately led to this decision by 
the court.6 The second election was never held. 
In reaching its decision that the promise of the wage increase was 
not primarily motivated by. an anti-union purpose, the court rea~ 
soned that "the situation [had not] sufficiently crystallized"7 when 
the employer promised wage increases in order to establish that the 
employer knew or should have known that the union was organizing 
or that an election was impending. In addition, the court concluded 
that there was no direct evidence that the employer knew the elec-
tion was forthcoming at the termination of the posting period. The 
court based this conclusion on three premises: first, no one informed 
the employer that an election was still possible; second, employer's 
counsel informed him that another election was "remote"; and third, 
the employees, in seeking a wage increase, did not endeavor to have 
the union intercede on their behalf.8 
It should first be noted· that the case before the court arose out of 
unfair labor practice charges rather than objections to conduct af-
fecting the results of an election. This seems to be the most critical 
factor of the case. For, in order to establish improper motivation in 
an unfair labor charge there must be a showing "that an employer 
knows or has knowledge of facts reasonably indicating that a union 
8 Ibid. The charges alleged that during the campaign the employer enforced an 
illegal no-distribution rule. 
4 406 F.2d at 11108. 
II Ibid. 
6 The union later amended its charge to include allegations that certain state. 
ments made by agents of the employer violated §8(a)(I) of the act. Although the 
board found that these statements did indeed violate the act, the court refused 
to enforce this portion of the board's order. 406 F.2d at IlI08-llI09. For the purposes 
of this discussion, however, this aspect of the case will 'not be considered. 
7406 F.2d at IlI10. 
8 Ibid. 
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is actively seeking to organize, or else that an election is ... impend-
ing."iI The requirement of "improper motivation" to substantiate 
an unfair labor practice is not a new one for this court, which has 
frequently stated that the burden is on the board to establish the 
improper motivation of the employer (outside of inherently destruc-
tive conduct)IO and not simply allude to it.ll This is particularly 
true in determining if a Section 8(a)(I) violation has been committed 
when the company alleges a proper business reason.12 This approach 
is to be contrasted with the somewhat lesser standard applied to ob-
jections to conduct affecting the results of an election. In the latter 
situation, the board usually applies the test of whether the activity 
in question destroyed the "laboratory conditions" of the election.IS 
If so, the election is set aside. Thus, in Gotham, since unfair labor 
practice charges were filed, the stricter standard was applied by the 
court, and correlatively the court continued to insist on substantial 
proof by the board as to the employer's improper motivation. 
§15.12. Other litigation. In NLRB v. Simplex Time Recorder 
CO.,1 the court enforced a board order which, in part, required the 
employer to cease and desist from "creating an impression of sur-
veillance." The trial examiner found the employer guilty of inter-
fering with union organizing in violation of Section 8(a)(I) of the 
National Labor Relations Act. Concluding that the board was war-
ranted in overruling all of the employer's exceptions, the court found 
only the breadth of the order deserving of consideration. The prob-
lem arose out of the court's previous decision in NLRB v. United 
Wire b Supply Corp.,2 which had refused to enforce a similar order, 
claiming that it was too broad in its application in that it proscribed 
the employer from creating the "impression" of surveillance.8 In 
Simplex, however, the court found that the order was not as "neb-
ulous" as it had appeared in United Wire. The court in United Wire 
had felt that the employer could not predetermine which activities 
would create an impression of surveillance and therefore the board's 
order could not have been enforced.4 However, having satisfied itself 
that infractions of Section 8(a)(I) violations have been delineated 
with more particularity since United Wire, the court in Simplex 
concluded that creating an impression of surveillance "means willful 
conduct and a justifiable impression."11 Based upon this definition, 
the court enforced the board's order in its entirety. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 888 U.S. 26 (1967). 
11 NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 68 L.R.R.M. 2699 (1st Cir. 1968). 
12 NLRB v. United Wire Be Supply Corp., 812 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1962). 
18 See NLRB v. Gisse1, 895 U.S. 575 (1969). 
§15.12. 1401 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1968). 
2812 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1962). 
8Id. at 18. 
4 Ibid. 
II 401 F.2d at 549. 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/18
414 1969 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSEITS LAW §15.12 
In T. O. Metcalf Co. v. NLRB,6 the board had found that the com-
pany (Metcalf) had violated Sections 8(a)(I) and (5) of the act by 
refusing to bargain with Amalgamated Lithographers and Photoen-
gravers' International Union, Local 3-L, AFL-CIO (Lithographers), 
and Section 8(a)(3) for discharging an employee for his failure to pay 
dues to International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of 
North America, Locals 18 and 67, AFL-CIO (Pressmen).'1 Both Metcalf 
and Pressmen sought review. 
Williamson Offset Company (Williamson), located on the seventh 
floor of the same building in which Metcalf was located, had eight 
lithographic employees represented by Lithographers. Metcalf's three 
lithographic employees along with its other pressroom employees 
were represented by Pressmen, which had a union shop agreement. 
These two companies merged in 1962. Following the merger, Litho-
graphers petitioned for an election at Metcalf,8 seeking to represent 
"[a]ll lithographic production employees formerly employed by Wil-
liamson. . . ."9 Although Metcalf and I Pressman argued that all of 
Metcalf's lithographic employees10 should be an appropriate unit, 
the board refused to disturb the bargaining history established at 
Metcalf and found that a unit of those lithographic employees for-
merly employed by Williamson would be appropriate.ll 
Following the election, in which the Williamson employees voted 
8 to 0 to be represented by Lithographers, interchange between the for-
mer Williamson employees and Metcalf employees took place to the 
point where certain employees were permanently transferred from 
the eighth floor, where Metcalf was located, to the seventh floor. One 
of these employees refused to pay dues to Pressmen, claiming that 
he was now represented by Lithographers. Metcalf refused to bar-
gain with Lithographers concerning any of the transferees and, at 
the insistence of Pressmen, discharged the employee who refused to 
pay his dues to Pressmen. 
Upon review to the court, Metcalf and Pressmen argued that the 
board's determination of the appropriate unit should be defined to 
have included only those individuals employed by Williamson prior 
to merger. The court, while not unwilling to interpret the board's 
decision in such a manner, found that since all the parties seemed 
content to accept the board's decision in the representation case, as 
ambiguous as it might have been, they must now be satisfied with 
the board's later clarification, if reasonable, as found in the unfair 
labor practice decision. The court concluded that it was indeed rea-
sonable and enforced the order. 
The court's decision is somewhat baffling because it is well estab-
6405 F.2d 1022 (1st Cir. 1969). 
'1171 N.L.R.B. No. 160 (1968). 
8 The name T. O. Metcalf Company survived the merger. 
II T. O. Metcalf Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 858, 842 (1962). 
10 In 1961 and 1962, before the merger, Metcalf had hired three lithographic 
employees who, under the union security clause, were represented by Pressmen. 
llU9 N.L.R.B. at 842. 
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lished that a board's determination of appropriate unit may only 
be tested in the arena of unfair labor practice litigation. The court 
appears to be overly stringent in refusing Metcalf and Pressman this 
opportunity because they "neglected to ask [certain questions]" at 
the original representation hearing or in failing to consider the ac-
knowledged ambiguity of the board's description of the unit because 
that issue was not previously raised. 
Another order of the board was enforced in its entirety in NLRB 
v. Consolidated Constructors and Builders, Inc.12 The board had 
found13 that Clark and Sprague, two employees of Consolidated Con-
structors and Builders, Inc. (Consolidated), were past members of 
Local 621, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 
AFL-CIO (Carpenters). On June 27, 1966, they obtained clearance 
from the Carpenters to become charter members of Local 1219, United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (Mill-
wrights), a new millwright local. Both employees were hired by Con-
solidated by August 8, 1966. 
On August 15, 1966, Consolidated and Carpenters reached an agree-
ment on a new contract. The board concluded that not only were 
both parties aware of the newly chartered local for millwrights but 
also that Carpenters was under instructions not to bargain for mill-
wrights.14 Unlike the earlier contract, the newly negotiated contract 
contained no "millwright" wage rate and asserted no claim on be-
half of Carpenters to trade autonomy over "millwright" work. Thus, 
the board concluded the contract with its union security clause ex-
cluded millwrights. Since Clark and Sprague were members of the 
millwright local and were performing only millwright work, Con-
solidated violated Sections 8(a)(I) and (3) of the act by discharging 
them because of their refusal to join the Carpenters' local.111 In ad-
dition, the board found Carpenters in violation of Sections 8(b)(I)(A) 
and (2) since Carpenters had insisted that the two employees become 
members of its union. 
The court agreed that the new contract was in effect at the time 
of the discharge; that it was clear in not covering millwrights; and 
since the carpenters brought pressure on Consolidated to discharge 
the two millwrights, the board had not abused its discretion in or-
dering joint and several liability for the back pay due these men.10 
C. DISTRICT COURT FOR MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
§15.13. Individual's Right to bring Section 301(a) suit. In O'Sul-
livan v. Getty Oil CO.,1 the court applied the reasoning of the Supreme 
12406 F.2d 1081 (1st Cir. 1969). 
18 165 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 65 L.R.R.M. 1415 (1967). 
14 Consolidated Constructors Be Builders, Inc., 65 L.R.R.M. 1415, 1416 (1967). 
111 Ibid. 
16406 F.2d at 1084. 
§15.11l. 1296 F. Supp. 272 (D. Mass. 1969). 
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Court in Vaca v. Sipes2 and found that, where an employee unsuccess-
fully carried his grievance to the final step, and where the union, in 
an admittedly good-faith decision, refused to pursue the grievance 
to arbitration, the employee has no recourse to the courts in a Sec-
tion 301(a) suit against the employer. Plaintiff was hospitalized from 
October 10, 1966, until January 3, 1967. During this period the de-
fendant terminated its operations at the plant at which plaintiff was 
employed. Defendant set a deadline of October 31, 1966, for its em-
ployees to notify it whether they desired severance payor to be trans-
ferred to another plant. On January 3,1967, plaintiff notified defendant 
that he elected to terminate his employment with full severance pay. 
Defendant interpreted this action in two ways: First, that the plaintiff 
had terminated his employment as of October 31, 1966, in which 
case he would not have been entitled to all of the sick pay he received 
but rather to a lesser amount of severance pay, the result being that 
defendant owed him nothing; and, secondly, that plaintiff, as of Jan-
uary 3, 1967, had voluntarily relinquished his job at the new plant, 
where work was available, and, therefore, was not entitled to any 
severance pay.s 
The plaintiff filed a timely grievance and was unsuccessful to the 
point where the next step would have been a request for arbitration. 
At this point, the membership voted not to proceed to arbitration. 
The parties stipulated that "refusal [for the union] ... was not a 
breach of its duty of fair representation nor was [it] ... arbitrary, 
capricious or based upon ill will toward the plaintiff.'" 
Thus, the issue presented\ to the court was clear: Does a good-faith 
refusal by the union to go to binding arbitration deny an individual 
the opportunity to litigate his claim of contract violation against 
his employer in a Section 301(a) suit? After a thorough analysis of 
various decisions, the court decided that the individual was indeed 
precluded from suing under Section 301(a). The basis for the court's 
decision stemmed, in the main, from the decision in Vaca wherein 
the Supreme Court stated, "we do not agree that the individual em-
ployee has an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitra-
tion .... "11 If the employee were given this right, the Court went 
on to say, 
. . . the settlement machinery provided by the contract would 
be substantially undermined, thus destroying the employer's 
confidence in the union's authority and returning the individual 
grievant to the vagaries of independent and unsystematic nego-
tiation.s 
2586 u.s. 171 (1967}. 
8296 F. Supp. at 274. 
4 Ibid. 
11586 U.s. at 191. 
slbid. 
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However, the Court did recognize instances where individuals are 
allowed recourse to the courts to litigate contract infractions by the 
employer. For the most part, these fall within two categories: (1) 
where an attempt to utilize the grievance procedure would be futile;'f 
and (2) where the union arbitrarily discriminates or processes the 
employee's grievance in bad faith.s However, since neither of these 
instances was present, there is no doubt but that the plaintiff had 
to attempt to utilize the grievance procedure. 
It is at this point where the reasoning in Vaca becomes meaningful. 
Once having utilized the grievance procedure, the union having 
treated the grievance in a good faith manner, it would destroy the 
very nature and intent of collective bargaining to allow this grievant 
to go outside the collective bargaining relationship. If he were allowed 
to seek redress in the courts, the contract agreed upon by his repre-
sentative and his employer would be weakened considerably. In effect, 
the employer would be bargaining with an agent who could not 
promise that his principal would abide by the contract terms. The 
result would be the anomalous one that the union would be no agent 
at all, and, as the United States Supreme Court said, " ... the con-
tract would be substantially undermined .... "9 It seems clear that the 
court in O'Sullivan reached the only proper conclusion. 
§15.14. Other litigation. In Local 2, International Brotherhood 
of Telephone Workers v. International Brotherhood of Telephone 
Workers,1 the court was faced with the legality of an "assessment" 
levied by the defendant against the plaintiff. Originally, in 1964, 
defendant had imposed a general dues increase in the per capita tax 
paid by members of the plaintiff. The district court, in a case arising 
out of the levy, held that the dues increase was properly enacted.2 
Its decision, however, was reversed by the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals which held that per capita taxes are "rates of dues" as defined 
by the applicable section of the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act of 1959,8 that the ballot conducted by the defendant 
did not conform to the referendum requirements of the statute,' and 
that the per capita taxes could not be applied retroactively. I! On re-
mand, the court ordered defendant to repay the per capita tax which 
was collected pursuant to the illegal retroactive clause of the general 
dues increase. 
'I'Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 577 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. ,1967). 
8 Vaca v. Sipes, 586 u.s. 171 (1967). 
9 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 579 u.s. 650. 655 (1965). 
§15.14. 1295 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Mass. 1969). 
2 Local No.2. International Brotherhood of Telephone Workers v. International 
Brotherhood of Telephone Workers. 261 F. Supp. 4!l!l (D. Mass. 1966). 
829 U.s.C. §411(a)(lI). 
'29 U.S.C. §4U(a)(lI)(B)(ii). 
I! Local No.2, International Brotherhood of Telephone Workers v. International 
Brotherhood of Telephone Workers. 562 F.2d 891 (1st Cir. 1966). cert. denied. 
lI85 U.S. 947 (1966). 
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In June 1967, the defendant, at its convention, passed a "resolu-
tion and assessment" which required each local to pay a certain amount 
per member for the period September 1, 1964, through June 30, 1965. 
This was the same period of time of the illegal retroactive dues in-
crease. The total amount due from the plaintiff equalled exactly 
the amount defendant was forced to pay back by order of the court. 
On plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court held that 
the "assessment" was imposed as a patently transparent attempt by 
defendant to circumvent and frustrate the orders of the court of ap-
peals and of this court6 and concluded that the assessment was only 
another attempt to obtain the per capita tax denied previously. Ac-
cordingly, it allowed the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
In Republican Co. v. Springfield Newspaper Employees Assn.,7 the 
court denied an injunction seeking to restrain the defendant from 
conducting an arbitration under a collective bargaining contract. 
There was no dispute as to the fact that the plaintiff had paid two 
employees the maximum sick leave under the contract. In addition, 
it was also clear under the contract that any sick leave beyond the 
maximum "will be solely at the discretion of the Company."s How-
ever, the contract provided that the company could not discriminate 
against an employee because of his membership in the union. Since 
the defendant contended that the denial of extended sick leave was 
based upon the employee's union membership, and since the con-
tract defined a grievance as involving "either an interpretation or 
application of the terms of this Agreement or any matter relating 
to the violation of the terms of this Agreement,"9 the court concluded 
that the denial of extended sick leave based upon union membership 
was an arbitrable issue. The opinion reaffirms the principle that 
doubts as to arbitrability of disputes should be resolved in favor of 
coverage by the arbitration clause.10 
D. MASSACHUSEITS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
DECISION 
§15.15. State jurisdiction after union election. In MacDonald 
v. Carr,l the Court refused to el(,ert jurisdiction in a case concerning 
challenges to a union election. Although the plaintiffs had unsuccess-
fully sought a preliminary injunction prior to the holding of the 
election and subsequent to the election had converted their petition 
to a bill for declaratory relief, the Court concluded that in light of 
the clear language of Title IV, Labor-Management Reporting and 
8295 F. Supp. at 1180. 
1294 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass. 1968). 
S Ibid. 
9Id. at 400. 
10 Steelworkers Trilogy, 863 U.s. 564, 574, 598 (1960). 
§15.15. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 17, 248 N.E.2d 808. 
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Disclosure Act of 1959, Sections 402 and 403,2 there is exclusive ju-
risdiction of challenges to elections in the Secretary of Labor. The 
Court. found to be particularly convincing the final sentence of Sec-
tion 403, "The remedy provided by this title for challenging an elec-
tion already held shall be exclusive." (Emphasis added.) The Court 
did point out that state courts do appear to have jurisdiction over 
election matters prior to the holding of elections but, in accordance 
with the language of Title IV and the interpretation afforded this 
language by the Supreme Court,S only the secretary of labor may 
seek relief for irregularities pertaining to the, election of union offi-
cers after that election has been held. The Court therefore concluded 
that, as the preliminary injunction had been denied, and as the plain-
tiffs had stipulated in their bill for declaratory relief that the election 
had been held, the superior court was without jurisdiction to deal 
with the subject matter of the suit . 
. E. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§15.16. Employment security. As of October 5, 1969, the max-
imum weekly benefits for unemployment compensation were increased 
to $62 a week while, at the same time, benefits were limited to 50 
percent of the claimant's average weekly wage in the base period.1 
As of October 4, 1970, the maximum weekly benefits will be equal 
to 52V2 percent of the average weekly wage of all eligible employees.2 
In addition, a limit of 50 percent of the individual's weekly benefit 
rate was established for dependency benefits.s Eligibility require-
ments were somewhat narrowed, however, in that the "good cause" 
for an employee leaving his employment must now be "attributable 
to the employing unit or its agent."" It would appear that this en-
actment effectively nullifies the decision in Raytheon Co. v. Director 
of Division of Employment Security,r> wherein the Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that the "good cause" for the termination of the employ-
ment relationship need not be attributable to either the employer 
or employee. 
§15.17. Minimum wage. In the minimum wage area, the law 
was amended so that the minimum wage ($1.60 per hour) now applies 
to retail, merchandising and laundry establishments for learners and 
apprentices after their first eighty hours of employment.1 In addition, 
229 U.s.C. §§482, 483 (1964). 
a Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964). 
§15.16. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 614, §3, amending G.L., c. 151A, §29(a). 
2 Acts of 1969, c. 614, §4, amending G.L., c. 151A, §29(a). 
8 Acts of 1969, c. 614, §5, amending G.L., c. 151A, §29(c). 
"Acts of 1969, c. 614, §2, amending G.L., c. 151A, §25(c). 
11344 Mass. 369, 182 N.E.2d 293 (1962). 
§15.l7. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 397, §I, amending G.L., c. 151, §7. 
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the law also provides that service persons who regularly and custom-
arily receive more than $20 per month in gratuities must receive a 
minimum wage of 96 cents per hour; an employee may appeal if 
proof is shown that the amount of tips received is less than $20 per 
month.2 Employees in charitable homes for the aged were exempted 
from the minimum overtime pay requirements.8 
§15.18. General labor laws. Buildings under construction and 
under supervision of the department of public health are exempted 
from the requirements of being properly lighted, ventilated, sanitary 
and heated from October 15 to May 15.1 Any lockout, or threat of 
a lockout, by any health care facility or any charitable home for the 
aged and, concomitantly, any inducement, encouragement, or actual 
strike, work stoppage, slowdown, or withholding of goods or services 
by any nurse or nonprofessional employee at these facilities was de-
creed to be an unfair labor practice.2 The applicability of the griev-
ance and disputes sections of the Massachusetts Labor Relations Law 
was extended to health care facilities and ch·aritable homes for the 
aged.8 
The General Court authorized the City of Boston and the County 
of Suffolk to make payroll deductions for those employees represented 
by recognized or designated exclusive bargaining agents as an agency 
service fee commensurate with the cost of bargaining, after the con-
tract has been ratified by a majority of the employees.· The City of 
Boston subsequently adopted this provision. The General Court also 
extended a provision for payroll deductions for union dues to any 
association or union of state, county or municipal employees when 
certified or recognized voluntarily.1I 
The "professional strikebreaker" law was amended by establishing 
a fine of $500 against any person employing a person 
. . . who regularly and habitually earns a major portion of his 
livelihood by entering into employment where a lockout or strike 
exists to take the place of an employee whose work has ceased 
as a direct consequence of such lockout or strike.8 
In addition, any person who engages in activities obstructing or in-
terfering with peaceful picketing or any right granted by state or 
federal labor relations law is subject to the same fine. 
Several minor miscellaneous measures were also enacted. Among 
these were statutes: authorizing the employment of certain females 
2Acts of 1969, c. 397, §2, amendiDg CL., c. 151, §7. 
8 Acts of 1969, c. 108, amending CL., c. 151, §IA. 
§15.18. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 114, amending C.L., c. 149, §1l5. 
2 Acts of 1969, c. 1111, §I, amending CL., c. 150A, §4C. 
3 Acts of 1969, c. IIlI, §2, amending CL., c. 150A, §9A. 
4 Acts of 1969, c. 1I115, §§I and 2. 
IIActs of 1969, c. 472, amending CL., c. ISO. §17A. 
8 Acts of 1969, c. 448, §I, amending CL., c. 149. 
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at five o'clock in the morning in bakeries;7 providing that municipal 
collective bargaining agreements shall supersede regulations made 
by a chief of police;8 allowing police officers, outside of state police, 
to form or join labor organizations;9 allowing children under 16 years 
of age to work as golf caddies during daylight hours;10 authorizing 
the commissioner of labor and industries again to suspend for two 
years the operation of the state labor laws for women and minors;l1 
prohibiting the unlawful discrimination in employment by refusing 
to hire or retain those persons who refuse to furnish information 
regarding arrests or convictions for a misdemeanor occurring more 
than ten pears prior to such re£usa1.12 
§15.19. Bills not passed. Among the major labor-related bills 
defeated by the General Court were measures allowing unem ploy-
ment compensation benefits to persons out of work as a result of a 
lockout; cash sickness compensation; elimination of many of the 
exemptions from the state overtime law; cost of living adjustments 
for workmen's compensation; coverage of nonprofit institutions under 
unemployment compensation; priority hearing and penalties for late 
payments of workmen's compensation benefits; increased benefits 
for aggravated injuries under workmen's compensation; elimination 
of workmen's compensation from the base period in unemployment 
compensation; and a measure establishing a state fund for workmen's 
compensation. 
7 Acts of 1969, c. 201, amending G.L., c. 149, §59. 
8 Acts of 1969, c. Ml, amending G.L., c. 149, §178I. 
9 Acts of 1969, c. 171, amending G.L., c. 149, §178D. 
10 Acts of 1969, c. 107, amending G.L., c. 149, §60. 
11 Acts of 1969, c. 89. 
12 Acts of 1969, c. 1114, amending G.L., c. 151B, §4. 
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